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In order to understand what has happened to what used to be the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, it would be necessary to consider a number of highly relevant 
issues, including the history of the Slav nations and the birth of the Yugoslav states, 
the upsurge of pro-Slav political movements which ran parallel to nationalistic 
tendencies and conflicts, the ethnic, cultural, religious and other diversities that 
have for centuries characterized the balkan nations, and so forth. While these issues 
will be the object of useful potential research, I leave them to historians, political 
scientists and scholars of other disciplines, who will probably find in them a fruitful 
area for enlightening the complex roots of disintegration of a state that had existed 
for over 70 years.
This paper has much smaller ambitions, as it is more limited in both its time 
frame and scope. It focuses mainly on the most recent period, and analyses primarily 
the economic consequences of disintegration of Yugoslavia (despite the importance of 
both history and politics in shaping the actual events). The principal economic reasons 
which have contributed to disintegration are discussed in section two. Section three 
examines the level of interdependence between the Yugoslav republics preceding 
disintegration. The consequences of disintegration for the economies of the newly- 
created states in two main areas - the monetary sphere and trade - are analysed in 
section four. Concluding remarks are drawn in section five.
1. 1 am grateful to the participants of the 2nd EACES Conference (Groningen, September 1992) for their
comments and discussion, as well as to Renzo Daviddi, Dinko Dubravcic, Mario Nuti, Saska Posarac and 
Zoran Trputec for comments on a first draft of the paper. Marko Jaklic, Pavle Petrovic, and Marjan 




























































































2.Background: economic roots of disintegration
The starting point for understanding the economic reasons which have contributed to
the breaking up of Yugoslavia is the uneven level of development between the more
2
developed and the less developed republics and regions. In order to bridge the gap
between the "North" and the "South", mechanisms had been devised which were to ensure
the continuous transfer of resources towards the less developed regions. The main channel
was the Federal Fund for the Development of Less Developed Republics and Regions, to
which all more developed republics had to contribute a certain percentage (less than 2%)
3
of their respective Gross Material Products (GMP). Despite such policies, the 
differences in the levels of development actually widened: the gap between GMP per 
capita between the most and the least developed region, Slovenia and Kosovo, increased 
from 5:1 in 1955 to 8:1 in 1989. In 1990, Slovenia with 8% of total population produced 
16% of Yugoslav GMP and contributed over 25% of total exports and imports; while 
Kosovo, representing also 8% of the population, contributed only 2% of Yugoslav GMP 
and around 1% of both imports and exports (see table 1).
At the background of these problems is a long-lasting controversy over who was 
"exploiting" whom. On the one hand, the more developed republics felt exploited because 
of obligatory transfer of resources which remained outside their direct control and hence 
were often used in unproductive sectors and in an inefficient way, and other policies to 
their disadvantage which had hampered their own development and growth (e.g. retention 
of foreign currency earnings from exports and tourism). On the other hand, the less
2. Yugoslavia was a federation composed of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Voivodina) within Serbia. The 
more developed regions included the republics of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the region of 
Voivodina, while the less developed the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
the region of Kosovo.
3. GMP, or "social product" in Yugoslav terminology, is the value-added at market prices of the 
"productive sectors" of the economy, thus excluding certain "non-productive" sectors such as education, 
health, defence, banking and other services. In this sense, it is similar to the concept of Net Material 
Product used in other socialist countries, but differs from such a concept because it is gross of 
depreciation. Initially these transfers were in the form of grants, while after 1971 in the form of 
obligatory credit at highly concessionary terms; from 1975 onwards the possibility was also introduced 




























































































developed republics felt exploited, and hence thought they had the right to development 
aid, because of the unfavourable terms of trade deriving from the structure of their 
economics (a large share of production in basic industries characterized by low efficiency 
and high capital-output ratios) in combination with distortions in relative prices (more 
diffused price controls of basic, respect to those of processed industries, implying lower 
prices in general). Although the debate has been going on for years, there is no clear 
evidence supporting either of the two views.
Another factor which has contributed to disintegration of the Yugoslav economy are
existing institutional arrangements introduced by the 1974 Constitution, which transferred
significant discretionary powers regarding credit allocation, fiscal policies, prices, and to a
lesser extent the use of foreign exchange to the individual republics, who had thus gained
the right to "sovereignty" over their respective economies. This had reinforced a form of
"economic nationalism", leading to uncoordinated investment strategies - unnecessary
duplication of plants in many sectors - and rising regional autarky and fragmentation of the
Yugoslav market, as evidenced by the falling share of inter-republican trade throughout the
1970s. Besides the fragmentation of the product market, there were also impediments to
the mobility of capital and labour across republican borders, and weak inter-republican
4
integration of enterprises, most operating on their own territory.
The economic crisis present since 1979, which progressively led the Yugoslav 
economy into a deep recession culminating in 1989 with hyperinflation, had added further 
impetus to regional conflicts of interests. However, it is only in 1990 that these conflicts 
sharpened, primarily for political reasons. In the second half of 1990, along with political 
disagreements between the republics, there was also dissatisfaction with the continuation 
of the federal stabilization programme (successfully implemented in the first half of 1990). 
which was believed to be contrary to the interests of all: the more developed republics, as 
major exporters, were affected by the fixed exchange rate and were pressing for a
4. The reasons for such tendencies are multifold, and go beyond the scope of this paper; for a further 




























































































devaluation, while the less developed republics were primarily hit by monetary restrictions. 
This led the federal government to accept certain compromises - initially concerning 
monetary restrictions - which marked the beginning of progressive weakening of federal 
control over economic policies (see Uvalic, 1992). In September 1990, Serbia failed to 
transfer sales taxes to the federal budget; in October there was the "trade war" when Serbia 
imposed special taxes on Slovenian and Croatian products (equivalent to introducing trade 
tariffs) and blocked payments to these two republics. Then there was the "currency war" 
between the republics which started in the autumn of 1990: following the general shortage 
of foreign exchange due to increasing withdrawals from bank accounts, commercial banks 
had started buying foreign exchange on the black market in neighbouring republics and 
competing over the conditions on which they would exchange foreign currency. In 
December 1990, there was a monetary raid on the monetary system, when the Serbian 
National Bank had surpassed by huge amounts the limits of credit expansion set by the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia. By the end of 1990, laws had been adopted by practically all 
republics which were not in conformity with federal legislation. With the progressive 
abuse of fiscal obligations towards the federation, in January 1991 the fiscal system had 
practically disintegrated, and in February-March, Croatia and Slovenia definitely stopped 
paying federal taxes.
These negative economic developments were preceded (and accompanied) by the 
worsening of the political-institutional crisis - frequent conflicts between republican 
governments and continuous disputes on the right compromise between Serbian demands 
to preserve the federation and the attempts by other republics to institute a loose 
confederation or independent states. The last attempt of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, in 
Spring 1991, to reach a compromise on a common set of economic policies which would 
enable Yugoslavia to remain united, had failed. In June 1991 the war began, in October 
Slovenia and Croatia became independent states and with their official recognition in 
January 1992 by the European Community, Yugoslavia ceased to exist.
It could be argued that if it had not been for the progressive worsening of the 




























































































disintegration. But in combination with the unfavourable political developments, these 
economic factors had become an additional (and important) reason for secession.
3.Local autarky or interdependence?
In order to evaluate the possible consequences of disintegration of Yugoslavia, is is 
necessary to determine the level of integration - or interdependence - between Yugoslav 
republics. An efficient functioning of a federation, in theory, implies a certain degree of 
economic specialization among its members, according to comparative advantages dictated 
by resources endowments, which in turn presupposes free mobility of goods, services and 
production factors. Some of the already discussed factors which have contributed to 
disintegration - regional disparities, absence of factor markets, substantial republican 
autonomy in economic policies, the tendency towards local autarky and the resulting 
fragmentation of the Yugoslav market - suggest that Yugoslavia was not an "ideal" 
federation and that strong elements in favour of effective disintegration were already there. 
This is in line with the view that Yugoslavia was an artificial entity so that its breaking-up 
was logically inevitable (see e.g. Ferfila, 1992).
However, there were also factors which were keeping the Yugoslav economy 
together (besides communist ideology), in spite of the non-existence of a favourable 
institutional framework. A closer look at the level of inter-republican trade flows reveals 
that during the 1970s, the share of inter-republican trade in total trade had indeed 
progressively declined (from 27.4% in 1970 to 22.2.% in 1980), along with a 
proportionally greater increase in intra-republican trade (from 59.9% in 1970 to 68.6% in 
1980), confirming an increasing orientation towards local markets (see table 2).^ With
5. On the condition, however, that there was readiness on all parts to introduce fundamental systemic 
changes in the Yugoslav economy. In the 1970s and even more in the 1980s, a radical reform of the 
economic system was essentially blocked by political constraints. Thus despite all economic reforms in 
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav economy continued to be characterized by features common to other socialist 
economies (see more in Uvalic, 1992).





























































































the economic crisis of the 1980s, however, this tendency was somewhat modified. In table
3 the shares of deliveries to the local market and to other republics in Gross Domestic
7
Product (GDP) of Yugoslav republics are presented for the years 1976, 1983 and 1987.
In 1983 with respect to 1976, the relative share of deliveries to the local market decreased 
in all but one region (Kosovo), and relatively more than the registered fall in deliveries to 
other republics (thus contrary to the trend observed for the 1970s); the contraction of 
domestic sales (both local and regional) was compensated by a substantial increase in the 
relative share of exports. Comparing 1987 with 1983, the opposite trend is evident: both 
deliveries to the local market and to other republics increased, although this time with a 
proportionally larger increase in local sales, parallel with a substantial drop in the share of 
exports in GDP. Taking the whole period into consideration, by comparing 1987 with 
1976, in two republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, deliveries to other 
republics actually increased (although slightly, from 22.7% to 24.2% and from 22.6% to 
25% respectively).
9
Since the above analysis is based on data for selected years, some of which may 
represent outliers (as e.g. 1983), it only permits some tentative conclusions. The analysis 
suggests that the widely held view in Yugoslavia - on the general and continuous tendency 
towards closing-up of republican economies through the reduction of inter-republican trade 
- is not valid for the entire period, and in particular for the early 1980s. The trend in inter­
republican trade was not unidirectional, characterized by a continuous decline over the last 
20 years, but rather by substantial variations, sometimes also in the opposite direction. The 
observed variations also show that the proportions between local, inter-republican, and 
foreign trade were closely related to export performance; in times of deteriorating external
7. These data are not directly comparable with data in table 2, since they do not represent total trade 
which beside deliveries would also include purchases, and because they are based on OECD estimates of GDP 
(and not the Yugoslav concept of GMP).
8. The exceptionally large share of exports in 1983 was partly the result of stabilization policies 
implemented in 1981-83 aimed at reducing the huge current account deficit.
9. Annual detailed statistics on inter-republican trade for the whole period (until 1987) do exist at 




























































































conditions, as in the early 1980s, the existence of alternative (republican) markets was an 
important factor compensating for the loss of foreign markets, suggesting that the swings 
in inter-republican trade were compensatory, rather than structural.
Moreover, in 1987 (the last year for which data for all republics was obtained), 
Yugoslav republics were more integrated among themselves than with the outside world. 
As can be seen from table 4, domestic trade in 1987 exceeded foreign trade in all republics, 
in some cases (Kosovo) by more than seven times. In general, the larger republics - 
Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia - were less dependent on domestic trade. Serbia (including 
Kosovo and Voivodina) in 1987 had the lowest share of its GMP traded domestically 
(40%), followed by Croatia (49%), Slovenia (56%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (58%), 
Macedonia (65%), and Montenegro (92%). However, Serbia proper (i.e. excluding the two 
regions), had a 61% share of domestic trade in its GMP, while Voivodina and Kosovo 62% 
and 88% respectively, suggesting a high level of trade dependence within Serbia (i.e. 
between Serbia proper, Voivodina and Kosovo) (Ekonomski Institut Beograd, 1991).
Similar observations can be made for the Northern part of the country. A large part 
of inter-republican trade of Slovenia and Croatia is between these two republics, and thus 
their dependence on trade with the other republics is lower if trade flows between Croatia 
and Slovenia are excluded. Croatia and Slovenia taken together in 1987 exported 35% and 
imported 26% of their joint GMPs to the rest of Yugoslavia (Ekonomski Institut Beograd, 
1991). These percentages are nevertheless still higher than the shares of exports and 
imports of these two republics to/from the rest of the world (19% and 18% of GMP 
respectively), confirming the importance, also for Slovenia and Croatia, of trade with the 
rest of Yugoslavia.
4.Maior economic consequences of disintegration
At present, the former Yugoslav republics face the same macroeconomic difficulties 
as other East European countries: falling output, high inflation, disruptions of traditional 
trade flows, an unstable exchange rate, a substantial budget deficit, rapidly rising 




























































































Yugoslavia have been further aggravated by the breaking up of the Yugoslav economic 
union. The process of disintegration started already in the autumn of 1990, but the 
Yugoslav economy effectively ceased to exist in October 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia 
proclaimed independence. The consequences of Yugoslav disintegration in two main areas 
will be discussed: the monetary sphere, and tra d e d
4.1.Monetary disintegration
The proclamation of independent states of Slovenia and Croatia in October 1991
marked the end of the Yugoslav monetary union. The National Bank of Yugoslavia
blocked all payments to the Northern newly-established states, which in turn established
their own central banks and introduced new currencies (Slovenia in October, and Croatia
in December 1991). Macedonia left the Yugoslav monetary union somewhat later, in April
1992, and was followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of which have on that occasion
introduced their own currencies. The remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro (or the
"new" Yugoslavia), have retained the currency used in former Yugoslavia (the dinar).
Slovenia established its own monetary system and introduced a new currency, the
tolar (T), on 8 October 1991.'' The tolar replaced the Yugoslav dinar and existing notes
and coins were to be physically converted, within three days, at a 1:1 conversion rate, in all
banks and the Social Accounting Office (see Mencinger 1992b). A flexible exchange rate
was introduced, with the DM as the main currency of reference (the Frankfurt cross
12exchange rates determine the other rates). Two foreign exchange markets were
10. Many other areas are not considered, including problems linked to the division of rights and 
obligations concerning the federal debt and foreign reserves, property rights (subsidiaries operating in 
other republics, natural resources, housing), fiscal obligations (past and present debts, including those 
towards, and of, federal institutions). The consequences of the civil war, including economic sanctions 
against Yugoslavia in 1991 and those against Serbia and Montenegro in 1992, are explicitly excluded.
11. However, provisional notes (coupons) were printed already during the last months of 1990 by the 
Slovenian Ministry of Finance, but as a parallel monetary unit within the Yugoslav monetary system (see 
Mencinger 1992b).
12. The alternative - introducing a fixed exchange rate by pegging the tolar to the DM - was thought to 
be unfeasible, because of very low foreign exchange reserves, high inflation due to downward rigidity of 




























































































introduced, called the market for current account transactions and the market for capital
account transactions, with two different exchange rates (see Mencinger 1992a and 
131992b). The first is, in practice, the enterprise foreign exchange market, on which
besides enterprises only commercial banks and the Slovenian National Bank participate.
Enterprises repatriating foreign exchange can dispose of their foreign currency within 48
14
hours, otherwise they must sell it to banks at the official exchange rate. The official 
exchange rate was devised as a moving-parity obtained from the current account market, 
by moving averages over a span of 60 days with descending daily weights, the speed of 
descendence depending on the rate of inflation. Foreign exchange accounts abroad are not 
allowed. The second foreign exchange market, introduced in order to legalize the black 
market, serves for trading currencies of individuals, private exchange offices and banks. 
On this market, the tolar can be exchanged for any foreign currency, at a rate determined 
by supply and demand, thus implying the introduction of internal convertibility.
At first, the official exchange rate was set at T32=DM1, which implied a 
depreciation both with respect to the Yugoslav dinar and to the provisional notes issued 
earlier (Mencinger, 1992b), but immediately after (October 1991) the nominal rate on both 
markets rose to around T42=DM1. Another major increase in the official nominal 
exchange rate took place in January 1992, following a sharp rise in the exchange rate on 
the legalized black market (to T52=DM1). However, due to continuing high inflation 
(although at a decreasing rate), the tolar has been losing value against the western 
currencies (although much less than other currencies in former Yugoslavia, see below), 
and by June 1992 the real exchange rate fell by a third of its initial level (Mencinger, 
1992b). Very restrictive monetary policies have caused a shortage of tolars and decreased 
demand for foreign exchange, and in recent months the supply of foreign currency has
13. This distinction, however, does not fully correspond to the IMF definition of current account and 
capital account transactions (see below).
14. Until 12 December 1991, 30% of foreign currency earnings also had to be sold for general needs, an 




























































































exceeded demand. Thus paradoxically, the main problem now is the overvaluation of the
, 15 tolar.
Although restrictive monetary policy has been one of the top priorities of the 
Slovenia government, initially it was difficult to substantially reduce inflation. 
Nevertheless, following independence, the monthly rate of retail prices has continuously 
been falling - from 21.5% in October to 15% in December 1991 to 11% in February and to 
5% in April. Among the main reasons for the persistence of inflation was high liquidity of 
banks, and the fall in imports from the rest of Yugoslavia which has resulted in price 
increases of domestic products. The latest figure for August 1992 - when the retail price 
monthly rate was only 1.4% - suggests that inflation may have been put under control 
(although the annual average rate in the first 8 months was 74.7%).'^
When the tolar was introduced, the Slovenian central bank had very limited reserves 
of convertible currencies amounting to $190 million, as it no longer had access to the 
federal foreign exchange reserves. By April 1992, its foreign currency reserves had grown 
to over $614 million, and by June 1992 they reached $825 million (Mencinger 1992b). The 
building up of foreign exchange reserves was initially achieved through the privatization of 
the publicly-owned housing stock, which was offered for sale in foreign currencies to the 
population at very low prices. The further accumulation of foreign currency was the 
consequence of restrictive monetary policies and related wage cuts, which have led to 
increasing exchange of foreign currency savings into tolars, as well as reduced imports 
from the rest of Yugoslavia and substitution of part of exports to former Yugoslavia by 
exports abroad. However, it is evaluated that present foreign exchange reserves are not yet 
sufficient to assure the regular servicing of Slovenia’s foreign debt of $1.7 billion in March 
1992 (excluding the share of Yugoslav debt).'^ IMF membership, which is expected in
15. See Ekonomska politika no. 2099, 22 June 1992, and Mencinger (1992).
16. See Ekonomska politika no. 2110, 7.9.1992.
17. Total Yugoslav external debt (both of the Federation and single republics) amounted to S14.5 billion 
at the end of October 1991; $2.3 billion is the joint federal debt, which some of the republics disclaim 




























































































autumn 1992, will therefore be important.
Croatia introduced a new currency, the Croatian dinar (CD) on 23 December 1991, 
after which the Yugoslav dinar ceased to be legal tender; but while the Yugoslav dinar 
became useless in Slovenia, initially it was still valued in Croatia. Apart from securing 
monetary independence, the introduction of the Croatian dinar was designed to stop the 
inflationary flood of Yugoslav dinars issued by Serbia to finance the war. For the moment 
the Croatian dinar is a transitional currency, but the government plans to replace it by a 
convertible Croatian Krone sometime in 1992.
Initially, the new currency was exchanged at parity with the Yugoslav dinar, but its 
exchange rate has since diverged. Shortly after its introduction, the exchange rate of the 
CD to the DM was fixed at 55 (compared with a rate of YD85 per DM in Serbia). The CD 
was devalued on March 5 by 21%, to an exchange rate of CD67=DM1, indicating the 
difficulties of the Croatian Central Bank to control inflation. Although monthly inflation 
fell from 20% in December 1991 to 16% in January and 15% in February 1992, by May 
the rate was again up to 24.4% (or an average rate from the beginning of 1992 of over 
116%).
As with Slovenia, a major problem for Croatia has been the lack of foreign exchange 
reserves to back up its currency reform. Croatia is, however, in a much worse situation, as 
its reserves are much lower (estimated at $500 million in September 1992), its foreign debt 
is almost twice that of Slovenia ($3 billion at the end of October 1991), while the war has 
substantially reduced potential earnings from tourism and shipping in 1992. In order to 
improve its foreign currency position, the government has decided to convert all foreign 
currency deposits held by Croatian citizens (estimated to be about $2.2 billion, with 
another $1 billion deposited in Belgrade) into foreign currency bonds, with an annual 
interest rate of 5%. The freeze on foreign currency accounts has greatly discouraged 
savings, including emigrants’ remittances. Croatia may follow the Slovenian example and 
offer public apartments for sale in foreign currencies. It was estimated that Croatia would 




























































































In Serbia, the monetary situation is far worse than in the Northern states. The
Yugoslav dinar was maintained as the official currency in Serbia and Montenegro (or the
"new" Yugoslavia, officially a federation since May 1992). Hyperinflation, mainly due to
rapid money emission to finance the war, has rapidly reduced the value of the Yugoslav
dinar. A new Yugoslav dinar was introduced at the end of 1991, and on 26 January 1992 it
was devalued to a rate of 65 dinars per DM, and again in April to 200 dinars per DM. With
inflation rising at a monthly rate of over 80% in May 1992, the depreciation of the
Yugoslav dinar has accelerated, and the margin between the black market exchange rate
and the official rate rapidly increased: in June 1992, the official exchange rate was still
held at YD200=DM1, while the black market rate was at the level of YD1,200=DM1, and 
18
hence six times higher. In only two and a half years the dinar depreciated from its late 
1989 rate of YD7=DM1 to YD1,200=DM1 by June 1992, or more than 170 times.
Only in June did the government elaborate a stabilization programme, which 
involves a more restrictive monetary policy, major state expenditure cuts, and changes in 
the exchange rate regime. In July, a currency reform was implemented: the dinar was 
converted into a new dinar at a rate of 10:1 (i.e. one zero was eliminated in all accounting). 
The new dinar was devalued by six and a half times, and was pegged to the US dollar at 
the exchange rate of YD200=$1; the first effect of these measures is a reduction of 
inflation - the official monthly rate of retail prices in August was down to 42.4%, while the 
decrease in liquid assets has also somewhat stabilized the exchange rate (the black market 
rate being "only" twice the official; see table 5).
Serbia has access to the former Yugoslav reserves which, however, rapidly declined 
(from around $4.5 billion in August 1991 to less than $1 billion a year later), and on which 
all former Yugoslav republics have claims. The Serbian debt is also greater in relation to 
foreign currency earning capacity than that of Croatia and Slovenia ($5 billion together 
with Montenegro, although the share of the latter was only $362 million in May 1992). As 
with Croatia, it has considerable foreign currency liabilities towards its own citizens.




























































































Already in 1991, in a situation of general shortage of foreign currencies, citizens could
withdraw their foreign currency savings only in dinars. At the beginning of 1992, the
Serbian government froze most hard currency savings, and it is assumed that the
government will convert the frozen savings into long-term bonds. With the currency
reform of July 1992, it is presumably again possible to withdraw foreign exchange from
bank accounts, but only in dinars and at the official exchange rate, and there is a limit set 
19
to DM150 per month.
Macedonia has also set up its independent monetary system and has introduced a
new currency, the Macedonian denar (MD), in April 1992, for similar reasons as Slovenia
and Croatia (protection from inflation in the rest of Yugoslavia and political
independence). The denar was exchanged at parity with the Yugoslav dinar. The intention
to introduce a new currency was announced to the National Bank of Yugoslavia in
advance; in return Serbia had promissed not to block trade and payments transactions with
Macedonia. Since on occasion of the introduction of the denar the inflow of Yugoslav
dinars from other regions was substantial, the Macedonian government limited the amount
of dinars that could be exchanged into denars. Yugoslav dinars returned to the National
Bank of Yugoslavia will cancel part of the debt owed to the federation; the Macedonian
part of foreign exchange reserves remaining with the National Bank of Yugoslavia will be
used for paying off the Macedonian part of federal debt.
The value of the denar has also been rapidly falling, more than the other currencies
in former Yugoslavia. In fact, by August 1992, the tolar was more than three times
stronger than the Croatian dinar, five times stronger than the Yugoslav dinar, and almost
20
ten times stronger than the Macedonian denar (see table 5). The exchange rate has 
somewhat stabilized in the last few months, at the level of MD360=DM1 in August 1992,
19. See Ekonomska politika no. 2102, 13.7.92.
20. This is directly reflected in huge wage differentials which have emerged between ex-Yugoslav 
republics: net average wages in Slovenia (DM 518 in May 1992) were approximately five times higher than 
in Croatia (DM125 in June), and almost eight times higher than in Yugoslavia (DM 68 in June 1992); see 




























































































and respect to the situation in Serbia, the black market premium has been lower.
Macedonia’s total foreign debt is estimated at about $80 million, while its foreign
exchange reserves are just under $30 million (plus a very small amount of gold). The
government therefore transformed all savings deposits (worth $1 billion) into bonds of the
21
National Bank of Macedonia, with a redemption period of 20 years.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the beginning of 1992 two currencies have been 
in circulation - the Yugoslav dinar, and the Croatian dinar - and in the meantime two 
additional currencies have been introduced: the Bosnian Serbs in Krajina, which have 
proclaimed their own republic (the Republic of Serbian Krajina), have introduced their 
own dinar, while in August 1992 the Bosnian (muslim) government has also decided to 
introduce its own currency (which neither the Croats nor the Serbs are willing to accept). 
At the end of October 1991, the foreign debt of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia 
amounted to $2.4 billion. It could be expected that these two new states will have the most
difficult time surviving as independent economic entities.
* * *
In conclusion, the introduction of new currencies, as both the premise and 
consequence of disintegration and monetary independence of the former Yugoslav 
republics, has had its benefits and costs. In theory, the main positive effect of monetary 
disintegration is the possibility of having an independent monetary policy, which will 
allow each ex-Yugoslav republic to proceed with stabilization (and other policies) at a 
fastest possible rate, since problems deriving from its realization affecting other regions of 
ex-Yugoslavia can now be disregarded.
At the same time, it has proved difficult to achieve these positive effects 
immediately. In most (if not all) former Yugoslav republics high inflation (and 
hyperinflation) persists, exchange rates have been highly unstable (with the black market 
rates at levels never recorded in post-war Yugoslavia), and the recession has deepened (see
21. The money can be withdrawn earlier only if used for construction of apartments, import of equipment, 




























































































tables 5 and 6). Even in the case of Slovenia, it has taken 10 months after independence to
substantially reduce inflation (which, however, is still at a very high annual rate), and
monetary stabilization has been paid by a very rapid fall in output and the highest rate of
22
unemployment growth among all ex-Yugoslav republics. Some of the gains are also 
likely to have been cancelled out by losses in other areas, primarily trade disruptions (see 
section 4.2).
The costs and benefits of monetary disintegration have also been distributed very
unevenly among the former Yugoslav republics. The benefits have for the moment
possibly outweighed the costs in only one out of six former Yugoslav republics - in
Slovenia - as it has protected it from the inflationary impact of rapid money emission in
Serbia. The same benefit deriving from an autonomous monetary policy was also available
to Croatia; but due to war conditions, monetary policies in Zagreb have been very
expansionary, similar to those in Belgrade, and consequently the potential positive effects
of monetary independence have not yet been realized. As to the rest of former Yugoslavia,
the introduction of separate currencies by Slovenia and Croatia did had a strong
inflationary impact; after their introduction, the Yugoslav market was flooded by dinars
23coming from the newly-created states. However, without a more in-depth analysis and 
detailed statistics, it is impossible to separate these effects from others contributing to 
inflation (primarily rapid money emission to finance the war, or absence of stabilization 
policies in Serbia). Therefore for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as late-comers 
in introducing their own currencies, the effects (and further implications) of monetary 
disintegration have for the moment been mainly negative (which does not preclude the 
possibility of longer-term net benefits). Finally, the main loser is Serbia, especially because
22. Respect to other former Yugoslav republics, the rise of unemployment in Slovenia has been the 
fastest: from 21,000 in 1988, the number of unemployed increased to almost 100.000 in mid-1992 (see 
Bartlett and Uvalic, 1992).





























































































it will no longer be able to share its financial burden (and related problems) with the other 
republics.
Monetary disintegration has also created very serious payments problems in trade 
and other transactions between former Yugoslav republics, which have not yet been 
resolved. In the absence of a common currency, and in a situation of a general shortage of 
convertible currencies, the tendency has been to return to practices, long-abandoned in 
Yugoslavia, such as barter trade and clearing account arrangements (see below).
4.2.Trade effects
In the period before and after disintegration of Yugoslavia, the general characteristic
of Yugoslav foreign trade was that of trade implosion, which affected all six former
republics. For 1991 as a whole, Yugoslav exports fell by 13.7% (to $13.8 billion), while
imports fell by 18.2% (to $14.8 billion), and this tendency continued during the first few 
24months of 1992. It is difficult to distinguish which part of the fall in trade derives 
directly from disintegration (disruptions caused by the breaking up of traditional links 
between partners, or by the introduction of trade barriers by the newly created states), and 
which part from the deep recession or from the consequences of the ongoing war (cut in 
transport and communications, EC economic sanctions). We will therefore concentrate 
primarily on some of the major problems which have emerged in the past year in mutual 
trade relations between the former Yugoslav republics.
Slovenia’s trade with other republics preceding disintegration accounted for almost 
one fourth of overall Slovenian activity. In the period January - June 1991, 24% of 
Slovenian sales and 20% of its purchases were from other Yugoslav republics; and despite 
the introduction by Serbia, already in October 1990, of trade restrictions (special taxes on 
Slovenian products), Serbia in this period still accounted for 6% and 5% of Slovenian sales 
and purchases respectively (see table 7). Nevertheless, for the whole of 1991, a 32%
24. Even in Slovenia, the region with traditionally the best trading performance, although there was a 
surplus on the trade account in the first quarter of 1992, exports registered a 6.3% decline with respect 




























































































decline in Slovenian sales and a 30% decline in its purchases from other republics is 
reported (see Lachi, 1992). In addition, many Slovenian enterprises handled a high
percentage of foreign trade for enterprises in other republics, and also had numerous
25
subsidiaries in other parts of Yugoslavia (in 1991, more than 500 in Serbia alone).
After the formal break-up of Yugoslavia, trade with former Yugoslav republics
nevertheless continues to form an important part of Slovenian trade. Immediately after
independence, in October-December 1991, trade with the rest of Yugoslavia was
substantially reduced (the share in total trade of Slovenian exports and imports to the rest
of former Yugoslavia had fallen to 23% and 17% respectively); but in the period January-
April 1992, Slovenian exports to former Yugoslavia again accounted for 32%, while
imports for 29% of total Slovenian trade (see table 8). In the first four months of 1992,
Slovenian dependence on imports from former Yugoslavia was evenly distributed between
Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics (15% and 14% of total imports respectively),
whereas on the export side Croatia was somewhat less important than the rest of
Yugoslavia (with a 15% share in Slovenian exports respect to 17% to other former
Yugoslav republics). The former Yugoslav republics taken together have thus remained the
main Slovenian single trading partner for both exports and imports; if the new states of
former Yugoslavia are considered separately, Germany is first, while for Slovenian imports
Croatia is the second and the rest of Yugoslavia the third most important partner (for
exports the rest of Yugoslavia precedes Croatia). It has therefore been evaluated that the
major burden of the trade sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in June 1992 will be
26born by Slovenia because it will lose one of its most important trading partners. Despite 
the absolute fall in Slovenian trade levels, trade restrictions and other political difficulties, 
markets of ex-Yugoslav republics have remained important for Slovenian trade; and 
considering that Slovenia was one of the regions least dependent on inter-republican trade.
25. Many of these firms have been confiscated by the Serbian government.




























































































this clearly illustrates that the level of interdependence between former Yugoslav republics 
is still high.
For Croatia, in 1989 about 20% of all sales went to other parts of Yugoslavia. The
most important trade partners were Slovenia (46% of total sales to other Yugoslav
republics), Serbia (28%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (26%). Although Serbian trade
sanctions introduced in October 1990 against Croatian products had resulted in a drastic
fall in trade with Serbia, there was some indirect trade through Bosnia. Croatia used to
purchase about 60% of its imported raw materials and semi-manufactured products from
other Yugoslav republics, and many Croatian enterprises are heavily dependent on other
inputs from ex-Yugoslavia. On the export side, according to a statement of a Croatian
Minister, in 1992 two thirds of Croatian exports were still directed to markets of former 
27
Yugoslavia.
Slovenia is by far Croatia’s most important country partner. Although trade 
exchanges between the two republics are down respect to the level when they were part of 
the Yugoslav federation, during the first four months of 1992 Croatian exports to Slovenia 
were worth $231 million, while imports from Slovenia $275. Croatia and Slovenia are
presently competing very intensely in the search of foreign markets, and there is
28
disagreement over a number of other issues.
Serbia’s trade with former Yugoslavia has also suffered in 1991-92. According to a 
recently conducted research (Ekonomski Institut Beograd, 1991), for Serbia the main 
consequence on the export side is the loss of markets in Slovenia and Croatia for products 
such as shoes and leather garments, means of transport, production and processing of 
tobacco, fibres. As to Serbian imports, for consumer goods imported from the Northern 
republics it is evaluated that the production of many of these products could be undertaken
27. See Poslovni svyet, 11.3.1992, as reported in Lachi, 1992, p. 103; unfortunately, no official data 
are available.
28. For example, competition between the ports of Rijeka in Croatia and Kopar in Slovenia, and 
disagreements over issues such as Slovenian property on the Adriatic coast, fishing areas, or savings of 





























































































locally; but there are a number of other sectors in which raw materials and intermediate
goods imported from other republics account for over 50% of inputs (see Ekonomski 
29Institut Beograd, 1991). For example, the giant car producer Crvena Zastava has had to 
substitute some domestic inputs for ones it used to procure from Slovenia and Croatia, but 
to maintain its current level of operations it has had no choice but to continue relying on its 
old partners. A major problem is energy supply, as in the past Serbia’s supplies came 
through Croatia, and Serbia can only cover around one fifth of its needs for petrol and gas. 
Serbian enterprises are therefore trying to enter into barter arrangements with oil suppliers 
in the now independent states, since there is disagreement over which currency to trade in. 
At the same time, many enterprises are also facing increasing problems with delayed 
payments.
Another point of contention are the conditions of trade. In order to avoid Serbian
customs regulations, trade has frequently been conducted through Bosnia as intermediary
on behalf of Croatian and Slovenian partners. In addition to the trade barriers introduced in
1990, Serbia has more recently limited shipments of goods to other republics in order to
avoid the possibility of shortages on the domestic market; thus in the winter of 1991-92, a
trade embargo on exports of food to Bosnia and Herzegovina was imposed. Further
restrictions were introduced by Serbia in January 1992, when tariffs on goods from the
Northern republics were increased by 20-40%; the intention was to push Slovenian and
Croatian goods out of the Serbian market and those parts of Yugoslavia still using the
Yugoslav dinar, thus offering major opportunities to domestic industries in crisis (Lachi,
1992, p. 105). However, the benefits expected from the imposition of trade barriers do not
seem to have been realized, as the restrictions have only contributed to a further decline of
30
Serbian production (according to some estimates, by some 20%).
29. Including black metallurgy, metalprocessing industry, construction of machines, processed chemicals, 
wood processing, wooden products, textile fibres, finished textiles, leather and furs, shoes and 
processed caoutchouc.




























































































Although there is an agreement in principle among the former Yugoslav republics to 
cancel all trade sanctions imposed by them since the war, most barriers are still effective 
and new ones are being introduced, and not only by Serbia. In July 1992, Croatia has 
announced its intention to introduce customs on imports of goods from Slovenia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, which has provoked protests from the Slovenians as 
they already had an agreement on economic cooperation which precluded the imposition of 
customs duties.
In order to improve the general trading conditions, negotiations on the future
economic relations between the former Yugoslav republics are in course with the
assistance of the European Community. In March 1992, an agreement was reached in
31
Brussels to form a free trade area out of the former Yugoslav republics. In the
meantime, bilateral agreements on both trade and payments have been concluded between
some of the former Yugoslav republics. In March 1992, Slovenia and Croatia entered an
agreement on economic cooperation regulating payments transactions and trade relations.
Slovenia has also negotiated a trade agreement with Macedonia, and is in principle
32
interested in forming a free trade area with all former Yugoslav republics. Since 1991, 
most of Croatian trade with Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia is 
regulated through non-residential accounts in domestic currencies. In May 1992, Serbia 
has reached an agreement with Macedonia on payments through a system of clearing 
accounts, while negotiations on free trade are in course. In July 1992 the Yugoslav 
government adopted a law regulating payments between former Yugoslav republics, 
according to which payments can be made either in foreign currencies or in new Yugoslav
dinars through non-residential or clearing accounts; in the case of payments in dinars,
33
credit facilities are also envisaged.
31. Sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have clearly postponed 
the possibility of putting the agreement into effect.
32. This would greatly expand Slovenia’s currently smalt market, which in turn would make the country 
much more attractive for foreign investors.




























































































In conclusion, as in the case of monetary disintegration, trade disruptions have also
affected unevenly the former Yugoslav republics. The larger republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia), which were less dependent on internal trade, are less affected, but as the case of
Slovenia clearly demonstrates, even its own dependence on ex-Yugoslav markets remains
high. Besides the loss of a huge export market, the Northern republics are having to replace
low-cost imports from the rest of Yugoslavia with more expensive ones. The smaller and
less developed regions are, however, incurring major losses: they are affected not only
because of a higher dependence on trade, but also because of the traditionally high deficit
34
in trade with the rest of ex-Yugoslavia (see table 4). Since the evening out of trade 
balances within the Yugoslav federation is no longer possible (as in the past), the largest 
costs will obviously be born by them, not so much by Kosovo and Montenegro which in 
the past had the largest trade deficits from inter-republican trade but are now likely to be 
helped out by Serbia, but primarily by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
The high level of inter-republican trade, maintained even in 1992, points to the 
benefits of facilitating trade links, rather than imposing new restrictions. The disruptions in 
trade are only contributing further to the deep recession in all former Yugoslav republics. 
Making up for the loss incurred by disintegration, by stimulating trade with countries 
outside the former federation, is proving to be difficult (at least in the short run), and is 
also almost impossible in the prevailing depressed trading conditions. The return to old 
suppliers and markets inside the boundaries of former Yugoslavia is effectively the easier 
solution. Therefore, out of economic necessity, trade transactions ought to be renewed and 
intensified.
34. In 1987, the more developed regions - Slovenia, Croatia and Voivodina - had a surplus from trade 
with the other republics, whereas the remaining republics all had a deficit in their trade with the rest 
of Yugoslavia. However, Croatia had a deficit in trade with Slovenia, but a surplus in trade with the 
other republics; Serbia had a deficit with Slovenia and Croatia, but a surplus with the other republics 





























































































Whether the benefits from disintegration of Yugoslavia have been greater than the
costs incurred essentially depends on the importance attributed to certain values - not only
economic - and the trade-off between them. It is very probable that political independence
to Slovenians and Croats by far outweighs the economic losses deriving from
35
disintegration (especially considering that they did not have much of an alternative). At 
the same time, from today’s - October 1992 - perspective, it may seem out of place to 
discuss the costs of economic disintegration of Yugoslavia, which effectively are, at this 
moment, negligible compared to the enormous costs of the war.
Nevertheless, in a longer term perspective, and from an economic point of view, 
intensifying economic cooperation among former Yugoslav republics would be beneficial 
for all of them. While there is no way back to a monetary union, this does not preclude 
cooperation in other areas; thus the effective implementation of the agreement on a free 
trade area among former Yugoslav republics adopted in March 1992, which could be 
supplemented with a payments agreement, could very well serve the purpose of facilitating 
trade links. The main obstacle is obviously political, but the bilateral agreements already 
being concluded (and negotiated) between ex-Yugoslav republics suggest that such a 
solution may not be so unfeasible after all. The sooner it is accepted, the better.
35. It is to be recalled that until the war broke out in the summer of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia (but 
also Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) were willing to negotiate a new solution for Yugoslavia and 
had made concrete proposals on how to establish a confederation, but the Serbian government remained firm 
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Table 1.Yugoslavia - basic regional indicators, 1990
Territ. Popul. ]Employ. GMP* Exp. Imp. GMP/cap
__ Li. share in total)____ Yuo=100*
Bosnia &
Herzegovina 20.1 19.0 15.8 12.9 14.4 10.0 65
Croatia 22.1 19.7 23.5 25.0 20.4 23.5 124
Kosovo 4.2 8.3 3.2 2.1 1.2 1.0 24
Macedonia 10.1 8.9 7.8 5.8 4.0 5.6 65
Montenegro 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.0 71
Serbia prop. 21.9 24.6 25.5 25.6 20.7 21.0 100
with K&V1) 34.5 41.5 38.1 38.0 30.2 33.4 88
Slovenia 7.9 8.2 12.3 16.5 28.8 25.0 200
Voivodina 8.4 8.6 9.4 10.3____ 8.3 11.4 118
1) The two sets of figures refer to Serbia proper. i.e. without
the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Voivodina , and with.
*1989.
Source: SZS. SGJ 1991. Tables 201-•1 and 201-2.
Table 2. Intra- and inter-regional trade in goods and services
(% share)
1970__ ___ 1224_____ 1980
Intra-regional trade
Bosnia &
Herzegovina 63.2 68.9 70.9
Croatia 62.8 64.5 71.9
Kosovo 56.6 55.8 65.6
Macedonia 66.5 68.3 66.4
Montenegro 48.7 55.5 65.5
Serbia proper 60.0 62.5 69.7
Slovenia 57.8 63.3 64.3
Voivodina 50.0 56.2 64.4
Yugoslav average
Intra-regional trade 59.9 63.6 68.6
Inter-regional trade 27.4 24.6 22.2
Export and unknown
destination_______ 12.7__ 11.8_____ 9,2
N<?t?: The figures refer to the percentage share of total
production of goods and services, in each republic and province.
traded inside and outside its own territory.
Source: OECD (1984), Economic Survey of Yugoslavia, pp. 48-9, as





























































































Table 3.Trade bv destination of Yugoslav republics, 1976-1987
D e .1 i v e r i e s t o : E x p o r t s
the local market other republics
(as a s h a r e  o f G D P )
1976 1983 1987 1976 1983 1987 1976 1983 1987
Bosnia &
Herzeg. 61.4 49.1 56.1 22.7 18.6 24 .2 15.9 32.3 19.8
Croatia 66.1 59.7 67.0 19.0 14.8 18 .7 14.9 25.5 14.3
Kosovo 56.8 58.2 64.6 25.7 19.2 24 .0 17.5 22.6 11.4
Macedon. 61.9 55.3 60.8 23.1 18.1 21 .4 15.0 26.6 17.8
Monteneg. 59.9 54.4 57.5 22.6 21.0 25 .0 17.5 24.6 17.5
Serbia pr.64.0 52.1 62.3 21.1 16.5 17 .4 14.9 31.4 20.3
with K&V 71.3 60.9 69.0 14.8 10.9 13 .4 13.9 28.2 17.6
Slovenia 60.9 42.4 57.5 22.0 15.7 20 .3 17.1 41.9 22.2
Voivodina 58.8 54.8 58.1 30.1 22.5 28 .8 11.1 22.7 13.1
Source: OECD (1992), based on data provided by the Serbian
Institute of Statistics.
Table 4.Trade in aoods and services of the Yuaoslav reoublics
(1987, as a % of respective republican Social Products)
T r a d e Trade balance in 1987
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
trade trade* trade trade
Bosnia &
Herzegovina 18.5 58.2 -2.3 -13.4
Croatia 15.6 49.4 2.5 1.1
Kosovo 11.7 88.0 0.6 -72.0
Macedonia 19.4 65.2 3.9 -3.7
Montenegro 16.1 91.8 -2.9 -61.4
Serbia proper 19.2 60.8 -2.2 -13.4
with K&V 17.8 40.3 0.6 -2.6
Slovenia 22.4 56.0 -0.5 20.1
Voivodina 16.1 62.4 6.6 34.5
*Domestic trade (IT) is calculated as the share of the average 
between the republic's imports and exports (IMP, EXP) in Social 
Product (SP) of the respective republic.




































































































Dinar 1 . 0 0 0 0 141.8 280 197.5
Denar 0.5657 360 495 137.5
Cr. dinar 1.6471 145 170 117.2
Tolar 4.9123__ _____ ÜIjJ___________ il__________ 1 2 J Ü
♦Calculated on the basis of the average exchange rate of the DM 
on the black market.
**The black market rate divided by the official rate x 100.
Source: Ekonomska politika, 7 September 1992, p. 8.
Table 6.Output and inflation of (former^ Yugoslav republics 










Herzegovina -7.9 -24.5 -25 -21 594 114* 329 429
Croatia -11.3 -28.2 -29 -28 608 122 286 311
Macedonia -10.6 -17.2 - - 608 102** - -
Montenegro -16.6 -13.2 - - 623 102** - -
Serbia -11.0 -17.6 -18 -3 591 121 304 435
Slovenia -10.5 -12.4 -18 -12 550 118 269 277
YUGOSLAVIA -10.8 -20.0 n .a. 588 118__ n.a.
♦Cost of living 
**January-November
Sources ; Bilten Banke Slovenije, May 1992; Savezni zavod za 
statistiku, Index, no. 1, 1992 and Statisticki godisnjak
Jugoslavije 1991; and Ekonomski Institut Pravne Fakultete, 




























































































Table 7. Slovenia's trade (purchases and sales). 1988-1991
(in %, total=100) January - June
____1988 1989 1991
Purchases from
Slovenia 62.3 59.0 63.2
Yugoslavia 25.0 27.4 19.8
-Croatia 11.1 14.6 10.7
-Serbia 8.8 7.5 4.9
Imports 12.2 13.3 17.0
Sales to
Slovenia 59.6 56.4 57.4
Yugoslavia 23.2 23.9 23.8
-Croatia 9.8 11.0 12.5
-Serbia 8.4 7.6 5.8
ExDorts 15.9 18.1 18.8
Note: The totals do not sum up to 100, which is probably due
statistical discrepancy.
SQPtçç: Official data provided by the Statistical office
Slovenia.
Table 8, Slovenian foreign trade since indeDendence. 1991-92
(in million of US dollars) (as % of total*'
Oct-Dec 1991 Jan-Aoril 1992 Oct-Dec Jan-ADr
EXP IMP BAL EXP IMP BAL EXP IMP F.XP IMP
1.WORLD* 1.114 1.144 -30 1.279 1.097 + 183 77 83 68 71
-EC total 884 651 +233
-Germany 355 255 + 100
-Italy 245 171 + 74
-EFTA 123 172 -49
2.FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 329 228 +110 607 448 + 158 23 17 32 29
-Croatia n . a . 275 231 +45 n. a. 15 15
-Other
republics n . a . 332 217 + 113 n . a . 17 14
TOTAL
(1+2)______ 1.443 1.372 +71 1.886 1.545 +341 100 100 100 100
♦Excluding former Yugoslavia.
**Both foreign trade and trade with former Yugoslavia.
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